When Iran launched some 180 ballistic missiles toward Israel on Tuesday, U.S. warships blocked some of them, as did Israel’s own “iron dome” defense structure.
But the strikes, which followed Israel’s attacks into south Lebanon and assassinations of Hezbollah leaders, seem to signal an escalation of the war that has raged in the region since Hamas fighters attacked targets in Israel almost a year ago.
Jeremi Suri, the Mack Brown Distinguished Professor for Global Leadership, History, and Public Policy at the LBJ School and in the history department at the University of Texas at Austin, says it isn’t clear what the parties to the attacks want to achieve, or how successful they are likely to be, given the many constraints they face.
Listen to the interview above or read the transcript below.
This transcript has been edited lightly for clarity:
Texas Standard: Israel and Iran have never been closer to opening up a new and far more dangerous front in the war that has engulfed the Middle East. Are we looking at a new chapter here?
Jeremi Suri: Unfortunately, I think we’re in that new chapter already.
Over years of conflict in this region, Israel and Iran have seen each other as adversaries, but they have largely avoided direct military confrontation. That has all changed now.
In April, Iran launched an even larger missile barrage at Israel. And now this is the second time that has happened. And we should expect, and I think we are seeing, direct Israeli responses against Iran.
During that earlier April attack, Iran warned Israel of the incoming missiles. It seemed as if this was a clear, almost symbolic response intended for perhaps domestic consumption in Iran. Yesterday seemed different. And now, with this talk of Israel, aided by the U.S., retaliating, what comes next?
Well, we’re on a classic escalation ladder, which is to say each side keeps upping the ante a little bit.
I think you’re right, the April attack was more symbolic by Iran. Yesterday’s attack was still symbolic, but a little more direct and a little less forewarned, as you said. And now Israel, which responded in a relatively restrained way in April, is talking about going up the escalation ladder and doing things perhaps a little more direct to Iran, perhaps undermining Iran’s nuclear facilities and things of that sort.
And that’s what concerns me, because at some point there has to be some desire on both sides, encouraged by the United States, to limit the escalation. Otherwise, tit-for-tat will continue to bring us to a larger and larger war.
Iran’s barrage of missiles yesterday was in response for Israel’s incursions into south Lebanon and its apparently very successful attack on Hezbollah, which has been considered to be a proxy for Iran. What’s the endgame, though, if Israel attacks Iran in a larger and direct sense here?
That’s a very good question. I have been concerned since we saw the pagers exploding among Hezbollah members, and this was a pretty nifty operation that the Israelis undertook. But I’m not really sure what the endgame is, because although Hezbollah was an enemy of Israel, it was a controlled enemy. And in taking the war more directly to Hezbollah, assassinating the leadership, Israel is now antagonizing Iran even further.
And a wider regional war is not good for Israel. Israel might be stronger than any one of its regional adversaries, but a regionwide war that would involve Iran, Syria, Jordan, perhaps Saudi Arabia… That would not be in Israel’s interest.
Israel is also terribly isolated in the world today. So I don’t know what Benjamin Netanyahu’s endgame is, and that is precisely what concerns me.
You think about that triggering moment, Oct. 7 of last year, coming up on the one-year anniversary of the attack by Hamas militants in the southern part of Israel on that music festival. We’ve gone from the fighting in Gaza to Lebanon and now to Iran. And here we are, the election season in the United States.
It seems to me that the U.S. is very much in a pickle here, especially as the Biden administration has beginning a lot of criticism for its support for Israel, especially with the Gaza operations.
Well, that’s true. And under any circumstances, American influence would be limited.
We provide a great deal of arms to Israel, but we do not control Israel’s political system. It is a democracy. Nor do we have direct control over the other actors in the region, many of whom are supported by Russia and other external sources.
Our influence was already limited. And then in an election year, the Biden administration is very careful not to alienate supporters of Israel in the United States, nor to antagonize critics of Israel. So the United States is playing a behind-the-scenes role.
The United States has tried to encourage a ceasefire, but that has not worked. I think the American policy now is to try to contain this conflict and to try to limit the direct conflict between Israel and Iran.
